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Abstract:
This paper investigates the strategic position of four European airports in the aviation
network by means of a generalised cost function. We compare the performance of the hub
airports London, Paris, Frankfurt, and Amsterdam. Our analysis entails flights from smaller
European airports via these hubs to intercontinental destinations and vice versa. The
comparative positions of the cities in the airport network is determined by a generalised cost
function in which travel cost, travel time and rescheduling time (as a function of the
frequency of the service) are included.
An important feature of our comparative study is that various market segments are
identified (business, tourists). We find that the positions of the hub airports for the business
class passengers differ from those for economy class passengers. Using high-speed rail as an
alternative for the European part of the trip is only attractive for a rather restricted segment of
the market.
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1 Introduction
The aviation sector is one of the most dynamic transport sectors. Large ongoing
investments in airports are required in order to accommodate the rise in demand of air
passengers. Airport operations are characterised  by indivisibilities (an additional runway
creates a discrete increase in capacity). Therefore, once the capacity is available, airports can
benefit greatly from a growth in demand with relatively low costs. A related phenomenon is
the presence of economies of scope for airports. As an airport attracts more passengers, thus
conveying the notion that it has more destinations and flights, its attractiveness as a node for
additional carriers increases. Given these features of the airport business (Doganis, 1992),  it is
not surprising that many airports are urgently looking for opportunities to increase the number
of their customers.
Airports basically operate on two markets: the regional (or ‘home’) market and the
transfer market. Strong competition may take place in both markets. The first market involves
passengers and freight that have the region around the airport as an origin or a destination. In
many large metropolitan areas residents can choose between more than one airport and so
competition between airports in the region can occur in various ways. Passengers will, for
example, pay attention to:
1 the services offered by the airlines using the airport: fares, frequencies, number of
destinations, convenient departure times, etc.;
2 the accessibility of the airport in terms of travel time, infrastructure quality for various
transport modes such as car, metro, etc.;
3 a local aspects of accessibility at the airport: parking regime, parking prices, car rentals,
location of public transport terminal;
3 b additional services of the airports: such as tax-free shopping, restaurants, casino, etc.
This list of quality aspects underlines the variety of actors involved in the production of
aviation services and the complementarity  of their activities. For I-3b we note inputs from
among other things airlines, public and private infrastructure providers, public transport
companies, airports, firms renting space at airports, etc. To achieve an attractive aggregate
level of services co-ordination of the activities of these actors is essential.
The above situation in which an area is served by more than one airport may take place not
only within a metropolitan area with multiple airports, but also in a non-metropolitan context.
Spatial market area analysis (see for example, Paelinck and Nijkamp, 1975 and Greenhut  et
al., 1987) may be used to identify the orientation of regions without an airport towards
neighbour regions which do have one.
The second market on which airports operate is the transfer market. The competition
concerns passengers or freight from distant places to be transported to other places farther
away that may use the airport as a transit point. The markets of origin and destination can
obviously be numerous in this case. Competition takes place with other hub airports. Here,
local accessibility is of no importance, thus implying that aspects 2 and 3a are no longer
relevant. These are replaced by criteria associated with the quality of the connection between
the incoming and outgoing flights. This quality depends on among other things the timetables
and reliability of the airlines as well as the airport facilities. For example, an airport based on
a one-terminal principle will realise shorter minimal connecting times than will multi-
terminal airports.
When comparing the airport competition on both markets, the transfer market is
usually more competitive than the regional market since people living in a particular regiori ”
often have fewer opportunities to take direct flights (there is only one airport nearby), whereas
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indirect flights they may use several competing hub airports. It is important to remember
the two markets are not independent. A large ‘home market’ of an airport implies that it
ly achieves high frequencies, thus making the airport stronger as a base of operations as a
airport.
In this paper we will focus on competition between airports on the transfer market.
will address the quality of hub airport services from a generalised cost perspective by
considering fares, travel times and the rescheduling costs of travellers. Other determinants of
the quality of an airport, which are more difficult to evaluate monetarily, are not included in
the analysis.
Our paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the specific airports of this
analysis. The methods used in the research will be explained and justified in section 3. The
results of the research are presented in section 4. This section will also examine by means of a
sensitivity analysis how the position of Schiphol airport (Amsterdam) will be influenced by
changes in ticket pricing or the frequency of service. The consequences of the completion of
the high-speed rail network in Europe as an important entrance or exit mode of European
hubs for intercontinental flights will be analysed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Exploring the airports’
The quality of the included European hub airports will first be quantitatively
compared in this section. Second, competition between airlines and airports will be given
prominence. Liberalisation in intra-European aviation, which has been implemented by the
European Commission, will possibly induce concentration and mergers resulting in only a
few dominant airlines. This may further stimulate the development of hub-and-spoke systems
on a limited number of large hub airports. If we consider these developments, it becomes
intriguing to investigate the position of the current large hub airports in Western Europe:
Charles de Gaulle, Heathrow, Frankfurt, and Schiphol.
21. International comparison of the airports
In section 3 the position of the four hub airports will be determined by means of a
generalised cost function. Ticket prices, travel time, frequencies and rescheduling times are
included in this function. Other important factors of airport competition are local market
potential, capacity of the runways, quality of the handling of passengers and goocls,  the
number of destinations, and facilities and tariffs of the airport. This section offers an
overview of a number of these factors for the four airports in our empirical analysis.
Table 1 shows that the potential market area with regard to population size is about
equal, while the size of the city and the national population are quite varied. The hinterlands
of the four airports scarcely overlap. When we consider the competition among the four hub
airports and other regional airports such as Brussels and Dusseldorf, good accessibility to the
airport by car and train is important. In this respect, Heathrow performs badly. The other
airports are linked to the international road and rail network. These airports will probably be
included in the European high-speed rail network.
’ This section is based mainly on ‘International comparison infrastructure’, Ministry
of Transport (1996) and ‘The Single European Aviation Market: the first five years’, ‘0
Civil Aviation Authority (1998).
.
Table 1 Main figures for the airports (data from 1994)
Schiphol Frankfurt De Gaulle 1 Heathrow
Home market (mln. Inhabitants)
0 Urban region 5 7.8 8.7 7.7
0 Radius of 200 km. 24 25 24 24
Airport  infrastructure
0 Number of runways 4 3 2 2
0 Annual capacity*r u n w a y 320,000 370,000 350,000 400,000
0 Terminal capacity (in mln.) 27 42 29 54
Performance airports
0 Flights per year 287,000 357,565 318,718 411,200
0 Utilisation rate (in %)runways 89.7 96.6 91.1 102.8
0 Passengers (in mln. year)per 23.6 35.1 28.7 51.7
0 Utilisation rate terminal (in %) 87.4 87.8 99.0 95.7
0 Freight (in 1,000 tons year)per 838 1,246 786 967
Average annual growth 1990- 1994
0 Flights (%) 9 3 9 3
0 Passengers (%) 11 6 7 5
0 Freight (%) 10 3 / 7 9
Supply  of internat ional  direct  l ines**
0 Number of countries (first week Oct. 1998) 93 114 116 114
0 Destinations (first week Oct. 1998) 225 259 249 269
0 Frequencies (first week Oct. 1998) 3,690 3,122 4,372 6,847
*  Number of flights per hour
**  Charles de Gaulle incl. Orly and Heathrow, incl.  Gatwick, Luton, Stanstead & City
Sources: Ministry of Transport, 1996
Adapted from OAG, 1998
Insofar as airport infrastructure is concerned, it is remarkable that Schiphol has a
smaller runway capacity despite it having four runways. This can be explained by the fact that
the runways at Schiphol can only be used in one direction. Terminal capacity will not be a
major problem in the long run, since it can be extended within a fairly short period of time.
Serious bottlenecks can be found however, in runway capacity as well as noise nuisance.
If we take note of the utilisation of capacity in 1994, Charles de Gaulle is reaching the
limit of its utilisation rate of runways and Heathrow is already exceeding its limit of runway
capacity. Schiphol performs relatively well; in both runways and terminal capacity Schiphol
has the most reserves. When we examine the average annual growth in flights, passengers and
freight between 1990-1994, the four airports are likely to encounter capacity problems in the
short run. For example, Schiphol has grown to 353,000 flights in 1997, which is more than its
officially-stated capacity of 1994. The transport performance has increased to almost 31
million passengers (capacity 1994: 27 million) and to 1.1 million tons of freight (Ministry of
Transport, 1997). In general, the capacity restrictions not only result from runway capacity,
but also emerge from environmental quality limitations. This mainly concerns the noise
nuisance caused by arriving and departing planes. Chapter 3 and chapter 4 planes create less
noise than chapter 2 planes. This means that restricting the flights of chapter 2 planes can
increase capacity.
The level of service is given by the supply of direct line services in the first seven days
of the month of October 1998 from all airports in our focal urban areas (Paris: Charles de
Gaulle and Orly; London: Heathrow, Gatwick, Stanstead, Luton, and City). Transfer
connections, irregular flights and charters are excluded from our consideration. Insofar as the ct
number of countries and destinations are concerned, London, Paris and Frankfurt perform
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equally. However, with respect to the frequencies of service, London performs best and Paris
is in second place. Amsterdam clearly lags behind the competition with respect to the number
of countries and destinations, but the average frequency of connections is higher than in
Frankfurt and almost the same as in Paris.
In table 2 the flights during the first week of October 1998 are presented for the four
cities. London has the most average distribution of flights. In Paris domestic air traffic and
services on - former - French colonies are over-represented. Orly concentrates completely on
these national links and connections with the former colonies, whereas Charles de Gaulle
serves European and intercontinental destinations. The position of Frankfurt within the
German air traffic is not as dominant as the position of the other three cities in their
respective countries. Given the small home market, the number and share of flights of
Amsterdam to domestic destinations is low: Schiphol needs to attract passengers from the
larger European market for increased numbers of intercontinental flights.
Table 2 Flights to destinations during: the first week of October. 1998.
I A m s t e r d a m  1 Frankfurt I London 1 Paris
Absolute % Absolu te % A b s o l u t e  % Absolute %
Domestic 124 3.3 708 18.5 1,660 19.5 2,349 35.0
Other European 2,773 72.7 1,793 46.8 4,792 56.3 3,033 45.1.
Intercontinental 917 24.0 1,329 34.7 2,055 24.2 1,339 19.9
Total 3.814 t 100 3,830 100 8.507 100 6.72 1 100
Source: adapted from OAG, 1998
An airport’s position in intercontinental air traffic is an important factor of its strategic
position as a hub airport in Europe. In absolute numbers, London is the main player, Frankfurt
and Paris score the same (the supply in frequencies is two thirds of the supply of the London
airports in both cases) and Amsterdam lags behind (London has twice as many
intercontinental flights). When we evaluate the share of intercontinental destinations,
Amsterdam (24.0%) performs the same as London (24.2%) and better than Paris (19.9%).
Take note of the emphasis upon the intercontinental destinations of Frankfurt: almost 35% of
all flights have an intercontinental destination.
If we concentrate on specific continents, Frankfurt appears to be the gateway for East-
European and Asian destinations, partly due to its geographic location. London serves all
continents relatively frequently and extensively with a small preference for North American
destinations. Paris has a strong orientation towards Africa, due to its colonial relations, and to
other French speaking regions such as Canada. Amsterdam has a relatively strong orientation
towards Eastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and South America.
Along with capacity, the user’s opinion and financial aspects play important roles in
the competitive position of airports (table 3). According to regular air passengers, Schiphol
has lost its leading position as the best quality airport (World Competitiveness Report, 1995).
For Frankfurt and Paris appreciation is rising - above the level of Schiphol - within the period
1990-1995. User opinion about Heathrow has not changed and is less positive than that of
competing airports. However, the results differ strongly among the various studies: according
to the magazine Business Traveller in 1994, Schiphol is rated as the best airport, followed by
Heathrow. Airport tariffs and labour  costs are important cost: factors of airlines. Nowadays,
airport fees consist of a fixed and a variable segment which is, according to passengers, noise,.*,
navigation, parking, et cetera. Handling and fuel are also important cost factors for an airline, -
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Table 3 Quality factors of airports (1994)
Schiphol Frankfurt De Gaulle Heathrow
User’s  opinion
0 1990 8.8 8.1 7.6 7.7
0 199s 8.1 8.4 8.2 7.7
Airport taxes
0 Boeing B737-200  (index) 100 171 111 120/52*
a Boeing B737-500  (index) 100 110 83 112/46*
a Airbus A-300 (index) 100 107 86 92/32*
a Boeing B747-400  (index) 100 112 113 87/30*
+ Passenger taxes in guilders p.p. 18/4*” 20 16/14*** 35/8*
*  high tariff/low tariff
**  dest inat ion/transfer
***  intercontinental/European
Source:  Ministry of  Transport ,  1996
2 2. The influence of world-wide alliances of airlines
A ‘hub-and-spoke’ system in aviation is a system where continental passengers fly via
a hub before they begin an intercontinental flight. The emergence of this system has resulted
in two major types of alliances between airlines. The first strategy is to co-operate with
partners within the continent (Europe) in order to combine passengers for intercontinental
flights and to distribute incoming passengers throughout Europe. The co-operation is usually
limited to ‘code-sharing’, where two companies agree to serve European relations jointly. The
second strategy is to co-operate with partners outside the continent in order to create mass on
the intercontinental link and offer more destinations on both intra-continental sides. This
approach usually leads to strategic alliances between the airlines. Both companies serve their
own continents where they can collect and distribute passengers and freight for the partner.
Agreements are made for code sharing for the intercontinental connections. For example, the
code sharing between KILM  and Northwest Airlines made it possible for KLM to serve 177
destinations in the US (transfer in the US) and for Northwest Airlines to serve 30 extra
destinations in Europe (Ministry of Transport, 1996).
The four home carriers of the hub airports studied (British Airways (BA), Air France
(AF), Lufthansa (LH) and KLM) are increasingly involved in code sharing within Europe
during the period from 1992-1997. Code sharing is not only used to collect passengers for
intercontinental destinations, but also to decrease the costs (larger planes or higher occupation
rate), or to offer connections with higher frequencies.
Four intercontinental alliances had been formed between airlines by 1997. Three of
these alliances contained a home-carrier, which is included in our analysis: only Air France is
not involved in these alliances. For the European airlines the connection between Europe and
the US is the most important intercontinental route. The destinations where partners from
European home-carriers are based (St. Paul, Houston, Dallas, Washington, and Chicago) are
not considered in our empirical study.
The percentage of flights carried out by home-carriers via their own hubs has
increased from 77% to 85% during the period 1992-1997. This is remarkable since the
European Commission is trying to increase competition in the European market with the
‘fifth-freedom and cabotage  rights’. Lufthansa and Air France have not yet used the
opportunities offered by the EC. British Airways took advantage of the possibilities to a
somewhat minor extent by trying to penetrate the German and French market and establishing -‘I
the Deutsche BA (DBA) and acquiring TAT/Air Libert6. However, these sister companies
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have not yet succeeded in obtaining a significant share of air traffic in the German and French
markets.
3 Operationalising the generalised cost function
3 1. Selection of airports
We have chosen the four largest airports in Western Europe in order to study their
quality as hub airports. A set of airports within Europe and outside Europe has been selected
to compare the costs for passengers when they use the hub airports as a transfer point on a
flight between these European origins and intercontinental destinations, and vice versa. The
following airports outside Europe have been selected:
l North America: New York, Los Angeles
l Central America: Mexico City
l South America: Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires
l Africa: Johannesburg
l Asia: New Delhi, Singapore, Tokyo, Beijing
For the selection of the European origin airports two criteria are used: first, the airports must
be dispersed throughout Europe, and second, the airports have to be located on the - future -
high-speed rail network. After applying these criteria the following cities have been selected:
Copenhagen, Brussels, Vienna, Milan, and Glasgow.
3 2. Operatiunalising  the strategic position of airports
Methodology of the generalised cost function
The strategic position of the four cities in the aviation network is determined by a
generalised cost function for both business and private travels. We can break down the cost
function in three components: ticket prices, travel time valuation and rescheduling costs and
two types of ticket prices: the least expensive economy class tariff for non-business travellers
and the least expensive business class tariff for business travellers. Travel time valuation has
been set to 18 Dutch guilders an hour (about 8.2 e) for the non-business traveller and 90
guilders an hour (about 40.9 +Z)  for the business traveller (in accordance with CPB, 1997 and
NEI, 1994). Since many business travellers fly economy class, the third category of the
business traveller with a business travel time valuation who flies at economy class fares is
added.
The travel time element consists of travel time itself and a penalty for not being able
to fly at any preferred time: the rescheduling costs. With regard to travel time, we use the
average travel time. In calculating the average travel time per connection, a flight with a short
travel time is valued higher since this flight is more favourable (than a flight with a longer
travel time) and therefore has a higher chance of realisation (for details, see Ndok et al., 1990,
and Bruinsma et al., 1999). The time needed to travel to the airport is excluded from
consideration. These travel times are not discriminating for the four hubs (they concern the
travel time to airports of origin and destination and are all identical). Still, the time needed to
travel to the airport, check in and wait for departure will raise the generalised costs. The
rescheduling costs are largely dependent upon the frequency of the service. The penalty has
been set to 25% of the average time between two successive flight alternatives (in conformity
with Bruinsma and Rietveld, 1993). Regarding the rescheduling costs, it is important to note
that as the frequency increases the penalty rapidly decreases. In other words, to add an extra
flight to a high frequency connection results in a relatively small reduction in rescheduling-..
costs, and, vice versa; to add an extra flight to a low frequency connection leads to a large
reduction in rescheduling costs.
Method of data collection
According to the World Airways Guide (OAG, 1998),  all flights within the first week
of October 1998 are analysed for the selected hub airports, with particular attention being
given to departure and arrival times, travel times and frequencies. On the Internet page of
EasySabre the tariffs for all flights (leaving on December 10 and returning one week later) are
inventoried. Two rules are applied in this process. First, the flights are fulfilled by the home-
carrier of the four hub airports (British Airways, Air France, Lufthansa and IUM). We
assume that, according to the hub-and-spoke system, the home-carrier of the airport examined
conducts intercontinental flights. As described in section 2.2, in 1997 85% of flights by
home-carriers will be performed via its own hub, despite the ‘fifth-freedom and cabotage
rights’. Second, the least expensive fares in the economy and business class per origin-
destination relation are analysed for the examined home-carriers.
On the Paris - New York and London - New York connections the fares and travel
times differ strongly. The Concorde flies respectively 7 and 14 times per week on these
routes. Travel times by Concorde are much shorter but the price is considerably higher. The
Concorde is excluded from our comparative analysis because a relatively high weight is
assigned to short travel times when one calculates the average generalised costs. In other
words, the high fares for Concorde flights are also more important in weight, which means
that a fast but expensive flight leads to a large increase in the generalised costs, since the
other flights have not been differentiated for price. The Concorde can only be included in the
comparison if the specific fares for all flights are considered. However, the direct matching of
8,500 flights to their fares would be an almost insurmountable task.
3 3. Data collection
A total of 1,699 direct flights have been traced between the four hub airports and the
ten selected intercontinental destinations from the World Airways Guide (OAG, 1998). A
first analysis of these data reveals that the frequency of the intercontinental connection
determines the frequency of services between European and intercontinental destinations. The
frequency distribution of the flights over the days of the week indicates that an even
distribution can be found for most connections.
For all flights between European airports via the hubs to intercontinental destinations and
vice versa, the travel time is determined by accounting for the minimal transfer time per hub
(according to the World Airways Guide, OAG, 1998),  and the time differences due to the
different time zones. Two weightings then take place:
Within a connection: as travel time decreases the weight will increase. This expresses a
preference for faster flights on a connection (in accordance with Ndoh et al., 1990);
Between connections: as the frequency of a connection maintained by the four hubs
increases, the weight of the connection in question within the generalised cost function
increases. In this way, the importance of a connection in the aviation network will be
corrected. New York is the most important air connection (35.9% of all 1,699 flights
involves flights from or to New York). The absolute importance of this relation in the
random test also gives an indication of the relative importance of this connection in
intercontinental air traffic in general, and is as such included with equal weight in the
generalised cost function. The intensively-served intercontinental destinations are
therefore more important in the generalised cost function than the less intensively-served
intercontinental destinations, such as Buenos Aires and Mexico City (with 2.9% and ”
3.2%,  respectively).
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4 The strategic position of four north-western European airports
Table 4 shows the results of the analysis for business and non-business travellers,
where business travellers are subdivided into passengers travelling at economy class or
business class fares. The ticket nrice  for business passengers in the business class and non-
business passengers ir
costs. The percentage
the economy class apparently contibutes  the largest to the generalised
of travel time and the frequency is larger for business trips, which is
y large increase in travel time valuation -- non-business 18 guilders an
guilders -- compared to the increase in ticket price between economy
and business class (business). What is clearly different is the
caused by the relative
hour and business 90
class (non-business)
composition of the generalised costs for the business traveller flying at economy class fares.
Travel time now becomes the most important component with a percentage of more than
50%. The financial benefit for business travellers flying economy class seems obvious:
generalised costs are - despite the equal and high travel time valuation of business travellers -
ss traveller who travels economv  class instead of businessmore than halved for the businc
class’.
Table 4 Results of the ana
generalised costs 1
Non-business passenger
Economy class
Amsterdam
Paris
L o n d o n
Frankfurt
Business passenger
Economy class
Amsterdam
Paris
L o n d o n
Frankfurt
Business passenger
Business class
Paris
Frankfurt
Amsterdam
L o n d o n
lysis of the strategic position of the hub airports; average
of a Euronean-intercontinental  return trir,_ -~
Percentage Percentage Percentage Generalised costs Score
Price Travel time Frequency (in guilders)
76 % 20 % 3.8 % 2,388.07 100 %
78 % 20 % 2.1 % 2,503.81 95.4 %
78 % 20 % 1.6 % 2,613.05 91.4 %
80 % 18 % 2.0 % 2,745.76 87.0 %
I I I I
39 % 52 % 9.6 % 4,697.22 100 %
41% 53 % 5.5 % 4,735.66 99.2 %
42 % 54 % 4.2 % 4,905.07 95.8 %
44 % 50 % 5.4 % 4,965.83 94.6 %
74 % 24 % 2.5 % 10,537.22 100 %
74 % 23 % 2.5 % 10,802.12 97.5 %
73 % 22 % 4.1 % 10,870.72 96.9 %
74 % 24% . 1.9% . 11.032.37 . 95.5 %
If travel time required to arrive at the airports had been taken into account, the
percentage of travel time in the generalised costs would have been higher. Assume for
example that total travel time between the start of the trip at home and the departure of the
plane is 2.5 hours. For the two standard cases -- business class passenger at business class
fare, and non-business passenger at economy class fare -- the increase of the travel time
2 In our analysis we proceed with the assumption that all business passengers value
time in the same way. It is likely that business passengers flying economy class have
a lower income and hence a lower value of time than do business passengers flying
business class. An intermediate level of value of time (e.g. dfl 50 per hour) could I * “
have been used for this group.
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percentage in the generalised costs would be about 4% for all airports. In the mixed case --
business passenger at economy class fare -- the increase of the travel time percentage is about
10%.
Another interesting finding is that the differences in scores of the airports (last
column) in the business segment (both business class and economy class) are smaller than in
the non-business segment. An explanation for business travellers in the economy class is that
the travel time valuation is identical for all business travellers. Given the large share of travel
time valuation in the generalised costs, the differences between the airports are limited. The
score for London on the business segment with business class tariff is only 4.5% lower than
that of the most competitive airport, Paris. If we consider the economy class fares,
Amsterdam scores best on both the business and the non-business market and Frankfurt
scores the worst, lagging behind with 5.4 and 13.0% points, respectively. The relative
positions of the airports differ strongly depending on the chosen tariff. Paris scores best with a
first position in the business class segment and a second position in the economy class
segment; Amsterdam follows with, respectively, a third and first position; Frankfurt is third
with a second and fourth position, and finally, London is last with a fourth position in the
business class segment and a third position in the economy class segment. The infelicitous
positions of Frankfurt and London seem to stem from the relatively large percentage of the
price in the generalised costs of these airports.
At this juncture of our analysis it would be interesting to examine the stability of the
relative position of the four hub airports, since we want to analyse the effect of improvements
in the airport infrastructure. The competitive position within the model can be improved in
two ways whereby the generalised costs are reduced: to increase the airport capacity, thus
enabling an increase in frequency of service, or decrease ticket prices. An increase in the
frequency of the service leads to a reduction in generalised costs as a result of lower travel
time because the rescheduling costs decrease.
The results of the simulation are presented in table 5. The table portrays the potential
changes if Amsterdam could successfully increase the frequencies by 50% and by 100%. The
effects of a decrease in ticket prices by 10% by the home-carrier -- in this case KLM -- are
presented. Firstly we will discuss the effect if there is an increase in frequencies. In the
random test 245 intercontinental flights from/to Amsterdam are included. For Frankfurt, Paris
and London these numbers are 347, 397 and 710, respectively. Doubling the frequency of
flights from Amsterdam roughly means that Amsterdam offers intercontinental flights more
frequently than Frankfurt and Paris, but will still lag behind London.
A change in the frequency of flights affects travel time and is therefore dependent on
the travel time valuation of business and non-business travellers. Amsterdam has the lowest
generalised costs for the economy class fares. Nevertheless, also here a number of interesting
findings are noteworthy. First, the decrease in generalised costs reduces as the frequency of
the service rises. This is as expected: adding one more flight to an already frequently served
destination will have less of an effect on the rescheduling costs compared to that of adding an
extra flight to a connection that is less frequently served. Secondly, a 10% reduction in ticket
price leads to a larger effect on generalised costs than a large increase in frequency. Doubling
the frequency results in a decrease in the generalised costs with 1.9% for the non-business
traveller. A 10% decrease in ticket price leads to a 7.6% reduction of generalised costs. For
business travellers flying business class, these percentages 2.1% and 7.3%,  respectively, are
not much better, despite the larger share of travel time valuation in total generalised costs.
With regard to the increase in frequency, the business traveller in economy class benefits
from his high travel time valuation - in conformity with the business traveller in business *I
class - but his financial benefit if the ticket price is reduced is the same as that of the non-
9
Table 5 The r>osition  of Amsterdam after increasing: freauencv and decreasing: ticket price
(in gklders)  for the three market segments”
A J U
. && / v ”
Non-business Business Business
Economy class Economy class Business  c lass .
Starting point
Generalised costs 2,388.07 4,697.22 f0,870.72
Score 1 1 3
Frequency + 50 %
Generalised costs 2,358.H 4547.61 10,721.ll
Score 1 1 2
Difference in costs I -29.92 -149.60 -149.61
Frequency + 100 %
Generalised costs 2,343.19 4,472.8  1 10,646.3  1
Score 1 1 2
Difference in costs -44.88 -224.40 -224.4 1
Ticket price - 10 %
Generalised costs 2,207.OO 4,5 16.14 10,072.29
Score 1 1 1
Difference in costs -181.07 -181.08 -798.43 4
business traveller in economy class. The business traveller flying economy class benefits less
from a 10% reduction in ticket price than from a doubling in frequency. However, the
differences in the reduction in generalised costs are small, with 3.9% and 4.8%,  respectively.
This exercise reveals that it is not straightforward to improve the strategic position of
a hub airport by means of an increase in the capacity of the airport infrastructure. Given that
the high frequencies already offered, a further increase in frequency allowed by a capacity
expansion has a relatively small effect on generalised costs.
An improvement in the capacity or a reduction in tariffs of a hub airport is not the
only factor affecting its competitive position. It is also possible that improvements in the
airport infrastructure or a reduction in the tariffs of competing airports influence the
competitive position. Therefore, the consequences for a hub airport -- in our example
Schiphol -- of an increase in the frequency of service by 50% and a 10% price reduction by
the competitors are presented in table 6.
As can been seen in this table, an increase in the frequency of service in the category
business travellers flying economy class leads to a shift in positions: Amsterdam loses its first
position and slips into second place. Amsterdam falls in the generalised costs in the other two
cases. As the airport with the most frequent service, London benefits least from the increase
of frequency. For the other airports the benefits are also less than for Amsterdam if frequency
increases by 50% (table 5: Amsterdam; non-business 29.92 guilders and business 149.61).
Amsterdam falls one place if the ticket price is reduced and takes second position for
economy class and last place for business class. The decrease in generalised costs for
Amsterdam is fairly small if we consider the low fares (especially for economy class trips but
also for business class trips) of airlines flying via Amsterdam.
1 0
Table 6 The position of Amsterdam in terms of generalised costs (in guilders) after
increasing frequency and reducing ticket price in the competing airports
Basic value Frequency + 50 %I Price - 10 %I 1
Price Difference Position Price Difference Position
Non-business
Economy class
Amsterdam 2,388.07 -- . . 1 -- -- 2
Paris 2,503.81 2,486.33 -17.48 2 2,309.23 -194.58 1
L o n d o n 2,613.05 2,599.40 -13.65 3 2,409.05 -204.00 3
Frankfurt 2,745.76 2,727.87 -17.89 4 2,526.68 -2 19.08 4
Business
Economy class
Amsterdam 4,697.22 -- -- 2 Me -- 2
Paris 4,735.66 4,648.27 -87.39 1 4,541.08 -194.58 1
London 4,905.07 4,836.85 -68.22 3 4,701.07 -204.00 3
Frankfurt 4,965.83 4,876.40 -89.43 4 4,746.75 -219.08 4
Business
Business class
Paris 10,537.22 10,449.83 -87.39 1 9,762.48 -774.74 1
Frankfurt 10,802.12 10,712.69 -89.43 2 9,999.42 -802.70 2
Amsterdam 10,870.72 -- -- 3 -- -- 4
London 11,032.37 10,964.15 -68.22 4 10,215.64 -816.73 3
5 The influence of the high-speed rail network
The importance of a good accessibility of the airports by road and rail infrastructure
was pointed out in section 2. If pressure on available airport capacity increases, it becomes
more appropriate to use land transport as the entrance and exit mode for passengers with
intercontinental destinations/origins. To do so would create airport capacity for
intercontinental flights for which no alternatives are available. The high-speed train can be
used for the collection and dispersal of intercontinental passengers from a comparatively large
segment of the European hinterland (up to 700-800 km from the hub airport). Plans for a
trans-European high-speed rail network have been drawn up since the early 1990s. Some
countries have already begun building tracks: France (TGV), England, Germany (ICE), Italy
(ETR), Spain (AVE), Sweden (X2000), and Belgium already have one or more tracks in
operation. The Netherlands are also likely to start and will probably use two systems: the
French TGV in the southern direction and the German ICE travelling easterly. Due to the
variety of national initiatives, uniformity barely exists and international co-operation is
difficult to realise. For the time being, only the French-Belgium-Dutch-British sections
(Eurostar and Thalys) on the international tracks are fully integrated.
5 1. Operationalising the high-speed rail network3
Information on travel times, frequencies, exploitation, and prices are unavailable,
which is not surprising, given the lack of information on the construction of the network
(which trajectories and their estimated date of opening of operation, and so on). In order to
include the high-speed train as an entrance and exit mode for passengers connecting for
3 The authors wish to thank Fons Savelberg from the Adviesdienst Verkeer en
Vervoer for his contribution in the determining of the assumptions. The authors are - ’
fully responsible for the use of these assumptions.
1 1
intercontinental flights, we must make a few assumptions about prices, travel times,
frequencies and quality of service. The assumptions are:
l Airlines participate actively in the collection and dispersal of passengers through the high-
speed rail network. This has a number of consequences:
l An integrated ticket will be introduced. Given the available margins in the current
ticket price between train and airplane of 5-15%,  the possibilities seem to be
restricted to that of giving intercontinental passengers using a high-speed train a
reduced fare;
l Passengers will be able to check in on the high-speed train, which lowers the
minimal transfer time at the airport to one hour. This almost equals the minimal
connecting time between two flights at most airports;
l European air connections that can be served by high-speed rail will be terminated.
l Allowing for a lack of information on frequencies, we assume that every high-speed train
will have a one-hour service, with the exception of trains to and from Brussels and the
connection Glasgow-London, which will offer a half-an-hour service. This will have the
following consequences:
l The average waiting time for the one-hour service will be 30 minutes (+ transfer
time);
l The average waiting time for the half-an-hour service will be 15 minutes (+
transfer time).
l Given the lack of information on travel times, it will be calculated on the basis of the road
distance (Michelin, 1988),  and the average speed of the high-speed train, which is 170
km/hour on trajectories with numerous stops (see table 7).
Table 7 Road distance and assumption of travel time (in hours) using: high-speed train
Copenhagen Brussels Milan Glasgow Vienna TotalL I
Amsterdam Km 738 204 1,088 1,289 1,150
Time 4h20min lhl2min 6h24min 7h35min 6h46min 26hl7min
Frankfurt Km 785 402 670 1,498 710
Time 4h37min 2h22min 3h56min 8h49min 4hl  lmin 23h55min
L o n d o n Km 1,411 258 1,188 612 1,566
Time 8h18min lh3lmin 6h59min 3h36min 9h13min 29h37min
I Paris I Km I 1,196
I
308
I
855
I
944
I
1,226
Time 7h02mir-r 1 h49min 5h02min 5h23min 7h13min I 26h29min I
5 2. The high-speed train used as an entrance and exit mode
Table 8 presents the consequences for the generalised costs of including the high-
speed train as an entrance and exit mode for intercontinental connections. The table shows
that in all cases the generalised costs will increase. This means that both the current travel
time per airplane and the transfer time at the airport are more favourable than the travel time
with the high-speed train, including the short transfer time at the airport. This is partially
caused by the comparatively long distances to the European cities under consideration, which
makes travel time long on the high-speed train. By considering all markets, the generalised
costs increase the least in Frankfurt, whereas for the other airports, the increase is about equal.
There is nevertheless a regular pattern in which the increase in Paris is the smallest and in.
“London it is the largest. Although the difference in increase between Paris and Amsterdam*&
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comparatively small, it is large enough for Paris to pass Amsterdam in the ranking of airports
in the category of business travellers (high value of time) flying economy class (low fares).
Table 8 Conseauences  of the high-speed train for generalised costs
1
Air
+J  I
HST T Difference inguiIders T Difference Price compensationin hours needed
Non-business
Amsterdam
Paris
L o n d o n
Frankfurt
Business-economy
Amsterdam
Paris
L o n d o n
Frankfurt
Business-business
Paris
Frankfurt
Amsterdam
L o n d o n
2,388.07 2,505.58 117.5 1 4,9 % 6h32min 6.5 %
2,503.81 2,6 10.26 106.45 4,3 % 5h55min 5.5 %
2613.05 2,739.17 126.12 4,8 % 7 h 6.2 %
2.745.76 2,823.34 77.58 2,8 % 4h19min 3.5 %
4,697.22 5,284.73 587.5 1 12,5  %
4,735.66 5,267.90 532.24 11,2 %
4905.07 5,535.73 630.66 12.9 %
4,965.83 5,353.74 387.91 7,8 %
10,537.22
10,802.12
10,870.72
11.032.37
6h32min 32.4 %
5h55min 27.3 %
7 h 30.9 %
4h19min 17.7 %
11,069.46 532.24 5,l % 5h55min
11,190.03 387.91 3,6 % 4hl9min
11,458.24 587.52 5,4 % 6h32min
11,663.03 630.66 5.7 % 7 h
6.9 %
4.8 %
7.4 %
7.7 %
As a result of the low travel time of non-business travellers, the increase of the
generalised costs in this segment is proportionally small. For business travellers flying
business class, the increase of the generalised costs is proportionally small as a result of the
higher weight of the business class fares, which are over twice that of economy class fares.
The generalised costs of the business traveller flying economy class increase fairly rapidly
due to the higher travel time valuation and the cheaper tariff. This becomes evident if the
airlines were to compensate the time loss by giving a discount on ticket prices: business
travellers would require a discount of nearly one-third on the economy class fare in the case
of Amsterdam. For the non-business travellers and the business travellers flying business
class, the discounts for compensating time loss are not too extreme. At this point two remarks
have to be made. First, the discounts concern the total ticket price including the
intercontinental part. With regard to the percentage of the European trajectory, this means that
the margin in the ticket price of 515% of the European trajectory, as defined in section 5.1,
will not be feasible. Secondly, the discount will increase rapidly for the business travellers
flying business class with an above average travel time valuation. For example, a lawyer with
an hourly tariff of 450 guilders must receive a discount of 24.2% on his business class ticket
to break even if he travels via Frankfurt, instead of the 4.8% mentioned in table 8.
And when we consider the distribution of passengers across the different segments, an
explanation can be offered. The share of travellers having a business purpose on
intercontinental flights is estimated at about 40% (see for example, Metropolitan
Transportation Commission, 1996). The number of business class seats on intercontinental
flights is 15-20%. We may assume that 20.25% of the passengers on intercontinental flights
are business travellers flying at economy class fares. These passengers therefore want to be
fully compensated for extra travel time due to the use of the high-speed train as an entrance or
exit mode.
Finally, the market where the high-speed train should be competitive with air transport
has been examined: this market entails distances of less than 600 kilometres. For this-”
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purpose, Brussels has been selected as the market from which the hubs collect their
passengers by high-speed train. We assume that every airport has a half-an-hour service with
Brussels, which thus limits the maximum transfer time from high-speed train to the
intercontinental flight and vice versa to 75 minutes. However, table 9 reveals that the travel
time for all four airports increases. For Amsterdam (204 km.), London (258 km.) and Paris
(308 km.), the travel time loss is limited to 3, 20 and 45 minutes, respectively. However, for
Frankfurt (402 km.) the extra travel time of using the high-speed train as an entrance or
mode is 1 hour and 45 minutes.
Table 9 Effect of the high-speed train on the generalised costs from Brussels
Air HST Difference in guilders Difference in hours
Non-business
Amsterdam 2,048.49 2,049.43 0.94 0.05 % 3min
Paris 2,095.59 2,109.07 13.48 0.6 % 45min
Frankfurt 2,276.62 2,308.16 31.54 1.4 % 1 h45min
L o n d o n 2,298.07 2,304.06 5.99 0.3 % 20min
Business-economy /
Paris 4,169.23 4,236.62 67.39 1.6 % 45min
Amsterdam 4,210.37 4,215.06 4.69 0.1 % 3min
Frankfurt 4,340.50 4,498.20 157.70 3.6 % 1 h45min
L o n d o n 4,47 1.54 4,501 so 29.96 0.7.% 20min
Business-business
Frankfurt 9,607.26 9,764.96 157.70 1.6 % lh45min
Paris 9,712.41 9,779.80 67.39 0.7 % 45min
Amsterdam 10,086.63 10,091.32 4.69 0.05 % 3min
L o n d o n 11,017.43 11,047.39 29.96 0.3 % 20min
exit
There are two noteworthy comments regarding these results. Firstly, the block system
used by airports, where planes depart and arrive in waves, appears to function rather well.
When we compare it with a high frequency high-speed rail alternative, we find that travel
time is hardly improved by a frequent service of the high-speed train.
Secondly, in the analysis the time required to check in and the transport time to the
airport or to the high-speed train station have not been considered. If it is possible to check in
for intercontinental flights from the train, this decreases travel time by at least 45 minutes,
since travelling by high-speed train requires passengers to arrive at most 15 minutes prior to
departure; whereas passengers must arrive at the airport at least one hour before departure
when travelling by airplane. A high-speed train station is usually located within urban
agglomerations and is therefore accessible by public transport. On the other hand, transport to
airports, which are usually located outside urban areas, takes more time.
In our Brussels example, the high-speed train will reduce travel time from
Amsterdam, London and Paris, but whether this is also the case for Frankfurt is dubious. In
the case of small travel time losses, the possibility exists for compensation of these losses
through ticket discounts. However, the possibilities are restricted: only for the European
trajectory does a price margin of 5 to 15% exist. Especially for the business traveller flying
economy class which, according to our estimation is about 25% of the passengers, this margin
is given away easily.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper the strategic position of a number of potential European hub airports
(intercontinental hubs) has been investigated through the use of the generalised cost method.
We analysed how the ‘hubs’ of London, Paris, Frankfurt, and Amsterdam perform compared
to one another with regard to flights from smaller European airports via the ‘hubs’ to
intercontinental destinations and vice versa.
From the qualitative comparison of the hinterlands of these airports, we may conclude
that, when considering an area of 200 km surrounding the airports, the market potential for all
airports included in the analysis is approximately 24 million inhabitants. The airports will
soon experience capacity problems. The problem of runway capacity appears to be of a more
structural nature than terminal capacity, which can be extended fairly easily. Accessibility by
road and rail is good. In the near future all the airports - with the exception of London - will
have a direct link with the high-speed rail network.
The level of service is given by the supply of direct regular services in the first seven
days of October 1998 from all airports in the urban areas of our concern (Paris: Charles de
Gaulle and Orly, London: Heathrow, Gatwick, Stanstead, Luton and City). Transfer
connections, irregular flights and charter flights are excluded from consideration.
In absolute numbers, London is the main player, Frankfurt and Paris are equivalent
(the supply, measured in frequencies, is in both cases about two thirds of the supply of the
London airports) and Amsterdam lags behind (London has almost twice as many
intercontinental flights). When we regard the number of intercontinental destinations,
Amsterdam scores the same as London, and is better than Paris, but is clearly worse than
Frankfurt.
The relative position of the cities in the aviation network has been determined with the
use of a generalised cost function in which travel costs, travel time and rescheduling time (as
a function of the frequency of the service) are included. We have compared the three
situations of the non-business traveller flying economy class, the business traveller flying
business class and the business traveller flying economy class. The travel time valuation of
the business traveller and the non-business traveller is 90 and 18 guilders per hour,
respectively.
The ticket price for business travellers flying business class and the non-business
travellers flying economy class apparently contributes most to the total generalised costs.
Clearly different is the construction of the generalised costs for the business traveller flying
economy class. The financial benefit for this segment seems obvious: the generalised costs
are halved - in spite of the high travel time valuation - when business travellers fly economy
class instead of business class.
It is remarkable that the relative positions of the airports strongly differ depending on
the chosen fare. Paris scores highest with a first position in the business class segment and a
second position in the economy class segment. Amsterdam scores second best with,
respectively, a third and first position. Frankfurt comes in third with a second and fourth
position, and London scores the worst with a fourth position in the business class segment
and a third position in the economy class segment.
The most important finding of this research is that increasing the frequency results in
insignificant decreases in the generalised costs due to changes in the rescheduling costs
compared to the effect of lower fares. One aspect not treated in this study is that extra airport
capacity can also be used to increase the number of destinations instead of increasing the -(I
frequencies. One other complicating factor worth mentioning here is that an improvement +i
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the quality of the airport, for example, the decrease of transfer times, may result in an increase
by the home-carrier in the price of transfer flights, especially if the airport increases airport
taxes in order to cover the quality improvement. Thus, investments in improvements in
airports not only lead to a reduction in the time component in the generalised costs, but also
possibly to an increase in fares. This could potentially lead to a disappointing result.
When we include the high-speed train as a European entrance or exit mode for
intercontinental flights in the analysis, we see that for an area of approximately 350 km
around the airport, the high-speed train can yield travel time gains for passengers. A wider but
limited extension of the area is possible if passengers are compensated for their time losses
with lower ticket prices. Especially for business travellers flying economy class -- about 25 %
of the passengers according to our estimation -- the possibilities for compensation are
restricted, given the combination in this category of high travel time valuation of business
travellers and low fares of economy class tickets. Our analysis reveals that the high-speed
train is only partially suitable as an entrance or exit mode within the European continent.
Most opportunities for high-speed rail connections with hub airports are in regions located
near to hub airports, and where there are no regional airports.
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